KOMPARATĪVISTIKAS ALMANAHS

JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE STUDIES

DAUGAVPILS UNIVERSITY
ACADEMIC PRESS "SAULE"
2023

Kačāne I., Hasan A. M. (red.) *Komparatīvistikas almanahs Nr. 16(45)*. Daugavpils: Daugavpils Universitātes Akadēmiskais apgāds "Saule", 2023, 174 lpp. https://doi.org/10.59893/jcs.16(45)

Kačāne I., Hasan A. M. (eds.) *Journal of Comparative Studies No 16(45)*. Daugavpils: Daugavpils University Academic Press "Saule", 2023, 174 p. https://doi.org/10.59893/jcs.16(45)

EDITORIAL BOARD

Ilze Kačāne, Daugavpils University, Latvia – editor-in-chief
Aveen Mohammed Hasan, University of Duhok, Kurdistan-Region-Iraq – editor

Elisa Bizzotto, Iuav University of Venice, Italy
Jian-bang Deng, Tamkang University, Taiwan
Stefano-Maria Evangelista, University of Oxford, United Kingdom
Sonia F. Farid, Cairo University, Egypt
Tatiana Filosofova, University of North Texas, USA
Rolf Füllmann, University of Cologne, Germany
Benedikts Kalnačs, University of Latvia, Latvia
Ervand Margaryan, Russian-Armenian (Slavonic) University, Armenia
Kristina Mullamaa, University of Tartu, Estonia
James M. Nyce, Ball State University, USA
Irēna Saleniece, Daugavpils University, Latvia
Anita Stašulāne, Daugavpils University, Latvia
Geoffrey Swain, University of Glasgow, United Kingdom
Sylwia Janina Wojciechowska, Jesuit University Ignatianum in Krakow, Poland

The publication of the Journal has been approved at Daugavpils University Science Council meeting on December 4, 2023, Minutes No 11.

Lay-out: RA Drukātava

All papers in the Journal are anonymously peer-reviewed.

ISSN 2255-9388 (print)
ISSN 2592-8279 (online)

© Daugavpils University, 2023

DAUGAVPILS UNIVERSITY

INSTITUTE OF HUMANITIES
AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE STUDIES

NO 16 (45)

CONTENTS

FOREWORD 6

PAOLA BRUSASCO
On Pedagogic Uses of Literary Machine Translation: A Case Study Based on the Language Pair English – Italian 10

EVITA BADINA, ŽANS BADINS
Translation Policy of Anglophone Literature in Soviet Latvia from the 1940s to the 1960s: A Comparative Perspective 32

RAMA ISLAM
Female Identity in Diaspora Society: Nilanjana in Taslima Nasrin's "French Lover" and Nazneen in Monica Ali's "Brick Lane" 58

JIHAN ZAKARRIYA
Ecofeminist Theology and Fundamentalisms within the Arabic Context 84

MERLINA KOSENI, ENKELEJDA CENAJ
Overcoming Prejudice in Society through Gadamer Philosophical Hermeneutics 110

ENKELEJDA CENAJ, MERLINA KOSENI
Customary Rights in Albanian Society and Issues Related to Gender (Kanun of Leke Dukagjini and Kanun of Luma) 126

BEATRIZ MATAFORA, KRISTĪNE KAMPMANE, ANASTASSIA ANTON
Education Divide: Civic Learning and Intended Political Participation among Youth in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania 144

ECOFEMINIST THEOLOGY AND FUNDAMENTALISMS WITHIN THE ARABIC CONTEXT

JIHAN ZAKARRIYA

Jihan Zakarriya, Ph.D., associate professor
Faculty of Theology
University of Oslo, Norway
E-mail: Jihan_zakarriya@hotmail.com
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0542-9354

Ph.D. Jihan Zakarriya specializes in comparative literature, postcolonial studies, gender studies, ecocriticism, and ecofeminist theology. She completed her Ph.D. in English and comparative literature at Cardiff University in 2015 and a Fulbright Scholar Fellowship at the University of Michigan in 2016–2017. In her postdoctoral research, Jihan Zakarriya is exploring ecocritical and ecofeminist theories and literatures, with a specific focus on the interconnectedness between environmental, political and gender violence in Arabic literature and culture.

JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE STUDIES NO 16 (45)
https://doi.org/10.59893/jcs.16(45).004

ABSTRACT

The paper seeks to examine and redefine diverse forms of fundamentalisms within modern Arabic contexts employing an ecofeminist theology perspective. Ecofeminist theology analyses varied forms of domination, androcentrism and superiority over women and nature through deconstructing and challenging masculinist interpretations, understandings, and linguistic expressions of religions. Ecofeminist theologians relate religions and humanism as forces of unbiased, uncategorized liberation, equality, and freedom. Although the concept of fundamentalism is controversial for definers, modern and contemporary academia and media relate fundamentalism exclusively to Islam, particularly with the emergence of militant Islamist groups and global terrorist organizations. Fundamentalist movements are hierarchical, essentialist and sexist. Existing scholarship on Islamic fundamentalism lacks the feminist perspective and overlooks important forms of nonreligious fundamentalisms in Arab countries such as militarisms and semitribalisms that participate in the inferior position of women and nature. This paper examines the role of some Arab thinkers in relating women, politics, religion, and nature and specifically refers to Averroes, Fatima Mernissi, Zainab al Ghazali, and Nawal el Saadawi.

Keywords: ecofeminist theology, fundamentalisms, militarisms, Mernissi, el Saadawi, Averroes

INTRODCUTION: WOMAN, RELIGION, POLITICS AND NATURE

The position of women and the environment in religions has been a controversial issue. For a long time, women have been fighting and refuting deep-seated sexist and androcentric interpretations of religious texts that perceive women as inferior to men, limit women's mental, physical, and psychological capabilities and abilities, and hence reduce women's socioeconomic and political roles, defining them to work inside the house. Intimately related to women's subordination to men is the dominant idea that nature and the environment are properties for men to explore and subjugate (Ruether 1997, 2012; Adams 1993; Heather 2005). In this sense, Muslim women are not an exception. Different Muslim sharia and fiqh scholars have been underestimating and inferiorizing women. Sharia is derived from the Quran, accounts of Prophet Muhammad (Hadith), and other important texts written by Islamic scholars or fiqhaa who write fiqh. Fiqh refers to the different interpretations of God's intentions and revelations in the Quran. If a Muslim person wants a religious opinion (fatwa), he/she consults fiqhaa. Two important and highly influential, yet different, fiqhaa and Islamic scholars are Abu Hamidal Ghazali and Ibn Taymiyyah. Al Ghazali is seen as a revivalist whose works on jurisprudence, theology, philosophy, and logic are studied and referenced in Islamic schools, universities, and religious institutions, while Ibn Taymiyyah's fatwas are seen as the basis of modern terrorism and fundamentalism (AbuKhalil 1994, 686; Bazzano 2015, 119). For al Ghazali, "marriage is a form of enslavement; thus, she is his slave, and she should obey the husband absolutely in everything he demands of her provided such demands do not constitute an act of disobedience" (Al Ghazali 2010, 120). He describes women as "innately lustful and evil" who are "to be controlled by men" for "God has appointed men as trustees over women and has called the husband 'master'" (Al Ghazali 2009, 8). Al Ghazali continues his sexist views on women and his discriminatory attitude towards "the nonhuman" stating that "the race of women consists of ten species, and the character of each (of these) corresponds and is related to the distinctive quality of one of the animals. One resembles the pig, another the ape, another the sheep" (Yavari 2004, 165–166). Ibn Taymiyyah, like al Ghazali, regards women's role in society as wives and mothers. Women's education is seen by him as unnecessary but not banned, as women's mental abilities are limited. For Ibn

https://doi.org/10.59893/jcs.16(45).004

Taymiyyah, women are weak and inferior to men, therefore "a woman needs to be safeguarded and protected in a way a boy doesn't need. She needs guardianship" (Ibn Taymiyyah 2011, 96). He compares women to slaves and animals, stating that "the husband has the responsibility of spending on her, as much as he has the responsibility of spending on his slaves and animals" (Ibid., 101). Al Ghazali's and Ibn Taymiyyah's inferiorization of women as "nonhuman" is still a controversial issue in contemporary Islamic thought. Many scholars claim that God authorizes men to be superior to women, the nonhuman, and the natural systems. Men should control and discipline women who are considered evil, sexual creatures and who lack agency.

Famous philosopher, physician, Islamic theologian, and jurist Ibn Rushd, also known as Averroes, is one of the early intellectuals and scholars to examine the inferior position of women in Islam from a global perspective. For Ibn Rushd, the processes of inferiorizing and secluding women have not only occurred within the traditions of monotheistic religions such as Islam, Judaism and Christianity, but had existed in Greek philosophy and culture, a long time before these religions emerged and dominated. For example, Plato believes that women should have "virtuous souls" and that only exceptional women who get adequate education can be "guardians" while the main mission of most women is "procreation" (Ibn Rushd 1974, 60–61). Likewise, Aristotle regards "the female is opposite to the male" and the relationship between them is "by nature subjects and rulers" (Aquinas 2007, 66). Plato and Aristotle see women within the essentialist roles of procreation and working inside their households along with slaves. Ibn Rushd traces how confining women to the biological roles of procreation, upbringing and satisfying men's desires "nullifies their other activities. […] Women frequently resemble plants in these cities. Their being a burden upon the men in these cities is one of the causes of the poverty of these cities" (Ibn Rushd 1974, 59). Insightfully, Ibn Rushd not only compares women's inferior position to plants or the nonhuman and the natural systems, all are subordinated and dominated by men, but also argues this inferior position of women, the nonhuman and nature is the main reason behind the widespread poverty, and socio-economic injustices. For Ibn Rushd, "women are of one kind with men and the women will practice the [same] activities as the men" (Ibid., 56). Therefore, Ibn Rushd emphasizes that with the appropriate education, "there would be among [women] warriors, philosophers, rulers, and the rest (Ibid., 56–57). Women and men are different but equal and

free. They can do the same jobs if they have the required talents and are provided with the same training, education, and opportunities. Ibn Rushd regards the inferiorization of women within both religious or nonreligious orders and societies as a political tool of hierarchy and patriarchy. The exclusion of women from accessing power, socioeconomic institutions and public domains creates unbalanced and biased societies and leads to poverty and injustice. Ibn Rushd's progressive views on women can also be seen as relevant to the concerns of ecofeminist theologians in their discussions of the concept of difference as diversity rather than opposites, their criticism of the sexist and androcentric interpretations of religious texts and the subsequent loss of the sacrality of earth and nature. Rosemary Ruether explains that "ecofeminism or ecological feminism examines the interconnections between the domination of women and the domination of nature. It aims at strategies and worldviews to liberate or heal these interconnected dominations by better understanding of their etiology and enforcement" (Ruether 2012, 22). She argues further:

> That is, social patterns developed, deeply rooted in the distortion of gender relations with the rise of patriarchal slavocracies in Ancient Near East that inferiorized women as a gender group. The system of domination of women itself was rooted in a larger patriarchal hierarchical system of priestly and warrior-king control over land, animals, and slaves as property, to monopolize wealth, power, and knowledge. (Ibid.)

Ruether refers to the important role of the institutionalization of essentialist (gendered) divisions in controlling and limiting women's access to resources and public spaces and hence reducing their political, socioeconomic, and cultural rights, and agencies. In this sense, "ecology poses a profound challenge to all the classical religions shaped by the worldview of patriarchy" (Ibid., 22). As explained by Reuther, Ibn Rushd discusses the cultural and socioeconomic sides of the complex relationship between Islam, nature, and patriarchy, arguing that fundamentalism and essentialism are intertwined, major obstacles in the face of progressive and fair attitudes towards women and nature. Ibn Rushd dissociates between religion and the oppression, and essentialization of women. Rather, he relates democracy and Islam. Unlike Islamic scholars such as al Ghazali, and Ibn

https://doi.org/10.59893/jcs.16(45).004

Taymiyyah who have denounced democracy and philosophical reasoning as heretic and anti-Islamic values (Sahri 2021; Peters 2005), Ibn Rushd explains that religious and democratic values are compatible since both aspire to establish justice, equality, and freedom among men and women. Geographically speaking, Ibn Rushd lived in Islamized Cordoba, now Spain, Europe, but had to think and behave according to conservative Islamic politics, cultures and theologies in Cordoba, the Middle East, and other parts of the huge Islamic Empire at that time (Adamson and Taylor 2004; Craig 1998; Sharif 1963). Rather than being torn between the huge differences between the Eastern and Western cultures, types of knowledge and historical situations, or just abide by one side, Ibn Rushd adopts a highly progressive, self-conscious, and conciliatory attitude, seeking answers to questions relevant to all humans in the West and the East. These questions include problems of equality, justice, freedom, religious tolerance, and intellectual openness to difference, human diversity, and unlimited, free quest for knowledge. Ibn Rushd's progressive concept of female equality in Islamic communities and in the West is political activism against forces of domination that trap religions and societies hostage to masculinist and phallocentric discourses of thought. Ibn Rushd explains that within a just, moral democratic society, "the nomos is an equal nomos, there is no superior among them. Hence, this city, the democratic one resembles a many-colored woven garment. Just as this kind, of garment is considered by women and youths […]. Unless strengthened by virtue or honor, it perishes rapidly, as is the case with democratic cities existing in-this time of ours" (Ibn Rushd 1974, 127). Ibn Rushd dates the inferiorization of women to political reasons. The dominant hierarchical political orders of his time, which often regenerate gender, social, ethnic, religious, class and age-related inequalities, and hostilities, intentionally meant to encourage fundamentalist attitudes to maintain superiority, whether class, racial or colonial.

Religion is politicized as an authoritative means of justifying such inferior position of women, of marginalizing youth to patriarchal authorities within private, public, and political arenas and of emboldening colonial expansions and wars. He declared that and all Muslims are "adherents of the Laws of God or Sharia" (Ibn Rushd 1974, 71). To fight fundamentalist attitudes, Ibn Rushd offers two ecofriendly attitudes towards Islam. Firstly, he encourages the idea of Ijtihad or the reform of Islamic laws, deep-seated judgments, and strict textualism in interpreting the Quran through attempting new interpretations and readings of the Quran.

He believes that the Quran is timeless and universal in the sense that Quranic verses are liable for re-interpretations by different western and eastern scholars. Muslims are not enforcing Islam on other nations by war or antagonism, but through spatial and mental tolerance and justice. Secondly, Ibn Rushd employs the functionality of the natural systems and nonhuman creatures as teleological evidence on the presence and God's creation. He attributes agency to all creatures and objects whether animate or inanimate. He states that "there are in the elements' souls creating each species of animals, plants, and minerals that exists, and that each of them needs a directing principle and preserving powers for it to come into existence and remain, they have absolute dominion over these latter souls and these bodies" (Ibn Rushd 2008, 476). He explains that passive agency is a form of power: "the passive potencies are in the same position as the active, for it is the passive potencies possessing matters which accept definite things" (Ibid.). According to Ibn Rushd, a perfect society is balanced, free, virtuous, just, and rational. If human rationality is the only reason behind human superiority, what happens, then, if humans lose their reason and act irrationally? Ibn Rushd warns that the societies "based on wealth and the hedonistic ones are of a single class" (Ibn Rushd 1974, 125), and that "the transformation in habits and dispositions necessarily changes according to that order, to the point that when the laws are utterly corrupted, the states [of the soul] existing there will be utterly base" (Ibid., 144). Ibn Rushd faced strong resistance from conservative and fundamentalist religious scholars and thinkers whose power, though stems from their strong hold on religious places like mosques and their strong cultural presence, is mainly driven by their ties and allies with Islamic rulers and caliphs (Nafi 2017; Baer 2021; Fierro 2021).

Ibn Rushd's specific reference to the marginalization of women and youth in relation to dominant religious fundamentalist attitudes and patriarchal political elites is still valid for an analysis of contemporary political, religious, and sociocultural conflicts within different Arab contexts. In the post-Arab Spring revolutions (2011–) in many Arab countries such as Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Syria, and Iraq, women and youth lead protests and sacrifice their lives. Yet, after the revolutions, women and youth are imprisoned, oppressed, and marginalized when the democratic transition is aborted. Arab people in revolutionary countries find themselves trapped between military men and Islamists, both are violent, repressive, discriminatory, and, this paper argues, fundamentalist. The following part of the paper examines how the corrupt marriage

between fundamentalist religious movements and political elites (militarized/military elites) functions in modern Muslim Arab countries, and how such a marriage affects women, and the environment.

PART ONE: REDEFINING FUNDAMENTALISMS IN CONTEMPORARY ARAB POLITICS

In 1899, Egyptian Islamic scholar and jurist Qasim Amin published his well-known book “The Liberation of Women”, which is seen as one of the early feminist readings of Islam. In “The Liberation of Women”, Amin defended Islam against accusations of oppressing and subjugating women. Rather, Amin condemned dominant oppressive and sexist practices and attitudes against Muslim women confirming Islam equated between men and women. He argued further that Muslim women should follow the footsteps of modern Western women in defending their equal legal rights with men and in accessing education and workforce. Amin rejected women’s seclusion, veiling, early marriage, and violence against wives and daughters:

> Nothing in the laws of Islam or in its intentions can account for the low status of Muslim women. The existing situation is contrary to the law, because originally women in Islam were granted an equal place in human society. What a pity! Unacceptable customs, traditions, and superstitions inherited from the countries in which Islam spread have been allowed to permeate this beautiful religion. Knowledge in these countries had not developed to the point of giving women the status already given them by the Sharia. (Amin 1922, 8)

For Amin, Arab women need to redefine their relationships with spaces, both private and public, to reclaim the rights given to them by Islam. With the decline of the Islamic empire and the emergence of Western imperialism, Arab women have experienced different forms of colonial and local corrupt structures and sexist stereotypes that sexualize and territorialize their bodies as domains of male colonial appropriation or native protection (Said 1979). Amin reiterates some ideas that Ibn Rushed had already argued almost ten centuries earlier. The past Islamic heritage still dominates and haunts the present and even the future

of Muslim men and women through being integrated and referred to in Islamic laws. Throughout the nineteenth century, Arab women were not allowed to work or appear in public. Only a minority of upper- and middle-class women accessed private education and the main roles of women were being mothers and wives. Nonetheless, the last decade of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century witnessed the emergence of diverse progressive intellectual, nationalist, and feminist movements in different Arab countries. Many Arab intellectuals, writers, and religious scholars such as Amin support the liberal nationalist movements in Egypt and North African Arab countries that propagated the building of modern Arab democracies after independence and the incorporation of women's rights within the progressive nationalist agenda. Women played an important role in anticolonial resistance, for instance, feminists such as Egyptian Safia Zaghloul and Huda Sharaawi led the first female public protest in modern Egypt in 1919, Tunisian Juliette Saada, Béatrice Slama, Ghilda Khiari, and Cherifa Saadaoui joined militant resistance. During the War of Liberation (1954–1962), French colonizers tortured and killed Algerian women and female militants. Algerian female figures such as Djamila Bouhired, Hassiba Ben Bouali and Zohra Drif participated in the political struggle of their country and Djamila Bouhired was imprisoned and tortured (Daoudi 2018; Macmaster 2020). Likewise, Omani women joined armed resistance in Dhofar (Al-Najjar 2003; Chatty 1996).

The first-generation liberal Arab feminists ask for the reform of personal status laws, women's access to education and work, and women's political rights. As different Arab countries started to get independence, mainly through military interventions and coups, and to build socialist republics, women fought for their rights. For example, in 1957, the Tunisian Personal Status law raised the age of marriage for girls to 17, banned polygamy, and gave women the right to divorce and to child custody. In 1959, Tunisians elected the female Member of Parliament. In 1962, Tunisian women were able to access birth control; adultery was a crime for both a wife and a husband. In 1965, Tunisia legalized abortion (Tanner 2020). In 1956, Egyptian women had the right to vote and had access to work in public domains, and in 1962, the Socialist Charter for National Action endorsed gender equality in Egypt (Ramdani 2013). In Algeria, women have access to education and in 1964, Algerians elected the first female Member of Parliament. As Arab women moved from the private to the public spheres and openly

https://doi.org/10.59893/jcs.16(45).004

participated in demonstrations, they defied major dominant socio-cultural taboos of women's seclusion and inferiority. Nevertheless, political Islam and Islamist feminists acted in opposition to liberal and Islamic scholars and attacked secular nationalism and feminist movements as westernized, anti-Islamic and immoral values. They called for the building of Islamic states in post-independence Arab countries. Female Islamists and Islamic political groups have propagated the founding of Islamic States based on uncritical acceptance of early interpretations of Islam. This includes the reuse of sexist and irrational interpretations that the main roles of women in society are childbearing and submission to their husbands (Al Banna 1944; Tchaicha and Arfaoui 2017). Islamists drew strength from this deep-seated heritage of sexist and colonial gendered stereotypes in Arab countries and used their military and political power to pressure local regimes to restrict women's freedom and rights, particularly in relation to personal status laws.

Arab women's gains in the post-independence eras were, then, limited by dominant patriarchal power structures. Being the powerful sides of power equations, military rulers, and religious structures, mainly the well-organized and widespread Muslim Brotherhoods, in most newly independent Arab countries such as Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Sudan, Libya, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon have rigorously followed aggressive and violent security policies of oppression. These security plans and policies often reintroduce or utilize fundamentalist ideas, and practices that are meant to control spaces and peoples. For example, the Muslim brotherhoods, who have been working together with military regimes to restrict liberal, socialist, and democratic opposition, have not only used violent and fundamentalist ideas against secular, liberal and democratic movements as anti-Islamic values, but have used militant violence such as the killing of the Egyptian Prime Minister Mahmoud al-Noqrashi in 1946 and planned to assassinate Second Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1956 (Matesan 2020). In "Fundamentalisms Observed", Martin Marty and R. Scott Appleby admit that scholars cannot agree on a cross-cultural definition of fundamentalism. Marty and Appleby prefer to use the term fundamentalist-like, identifying the main characteristics of fundamentalist-like religious movements as such, which no longer perceive themselves as reeling under the corrosive effects of secular life. On the contrary, they perceive themselves as fighting back, they use militant and unmilitant ways, are selective and exclusive, and fight for God against specific enemies or others (Marty and Appleby 1994, ix–x). Muslim Brotherhoods in Egypt are

a good example of such an ideological shift between militant and unmilitant activism. Following their violence under President Nasser, Muslim Brotherhoods shifted to civil activism. Militant Islamist groups like the Gama'a Islamiyya in Egypt (Islamist Group) prioritized violence and succeeded in assassinating the third Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981; they attempted to seize some police stations and Egyptian TV, but their tries and endeavors were aborted by Egyptian military and police that regained peace and control over the country (Palmer 2007; Voll 1994). The political rivalry between the ruling military and the militant Islamic Salvation Front that won parliamentary majority led to a bloody civil war in Algeria (1991–2002) where both sides employed inhuman atrocities and systematized revenge rape (Pennel 2021; Mortimer 1996).

In a similar way, independent monarchies like Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Emirates, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar utilized security forces and religious figures to uphold their power and to silence liberal or democratic opposition. For instance, Muslim Brotherhoods in Kuwait and Morocco have dominated the political scene as the main opposition since the 1960s (Solomon and Tausch 2020). Saudi Arabia have produced and propagated Wahhabism as the true form of Islam (Ahmed 2011; Zdanowski 1994; Dawisha 2016). Wahhabism was established by Mohammad ibn Abdel al-Wahab who adopted his ideas from Ibn Taymiyyah. Political Islam groups in different Arab countries have persistently and consistently adopted varied forms of fundamentalist ideas and practices claiming they speak for Islam. As the socialist systems in Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, Iraq, and Algeria started to collapse in the 1970s, militant fundamentalists and political Islam parties seized the chance to establish Islamic States with different outcomes to different Arab countries. While ideas and activities of the Muslim Brotherhoods spread in public cultures, and spaces, organized fundamentalist groups launched attacks on liberal thinkers and religious scholars in Egypt, Morocco, and Algeria and finally the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1991). Military, religious, and royal elites and rulers rewarded their followers by distributing land, resources and other economic-social benefits and advantages among them. The easy transfer of ideas of Wahhabism, Salafism, and Muslim Brotherhoods due to high immigration levels to oil countries in the Gulf and the emergence of TV directly affected cultural norms and attitudes towards women (Galal 2014; Khalil and Kraidy 2009). Arab women have experienced the duality between progressive ideas of gender equality and access to public

https://doi.org/10.59893/jcs.16(45).004

places and workspaces, and the resurgence of sexist interpretation of religious texts such as women's inferiority and dependency on their male guardians and the reduction of women to the biological roles of mothers and wives. Moreover, ritualized Islam demanded women to follow the strict rules concerning women's dress, veil, public appearance, and work only due to economic necessity.

The political use of fundamentalist religious movements is, however, an international phenomenon. Noam Chomsky argues that "whether Christian or Jewish or Islamic or Hindu, the fundamentalist religious impulse can be turned to serve political agendas" (Chomsky 2006, 1). He continues that "in the past 25 years, fundamentalism has been turned for the first time into a major political force. It's a conscious effort, I think, to try to undermine progressive social policies" (Ibid., 1–2). Chomsky proposes that the dynamics of fundamentalism is "universal" and should be understood as a political force "to shift the focus of many voters from the issues that really affect their interests (such as health, education, economic issues, wages) to religious crusades to block the teaching of evolution, gay rights, and abortion rights" (Ibid., 3). For Chomsky, the rise and use of fundamentalism as a general phenomenon across cultures correlate with social and economic programmes that cause hardships for most of the populations. Fundamentalist struggles, the irrationality towards ecological systems and the impoverishment of populations worldwide, particularly lower classes, and women are dominant aspects of modern societies based on capitalism, neoimperialism and socio-economic hierarchies. In "Covering Islam", Edward Said admits that "Islamic religious fervor and political objective join to create violent results" (Said 1997, 11). However, Said argues convincingly that Islamic fundamentalists are minorities that do not represent the majority of Muslim populations. Said emphasizes the fact that militant Islamists and Arab patriarchal authorities are largely supported and used by Western neo-imperial powers stating that "many of the Muslim insurgents — particularly the Taliban — armed, trained, and bankrolled by the United States have now overrun the country" (Said 1997, 9).

Contemplating Ibn Rushd's, Said's and Chomsky's discussions of patriarchy, extremism, and fundamentalism within Arabic and global contexts, this paper argues that there are global and local forms of nonreligious fundamentalisms that, many times, are as dangerous and contagious as religious fundamentalisms. This paper considers military and royal regimes in many Arab countries fundamentalist-like movements. They are pure, exclusive

minorities, supported by loyal, advantaged minorities including extended families, policemen, military men, and elite businessmen. They appeal to their populations', particularly women's, religious and moral values as well. For example, military rulers claim they protect the gains Arab women have achieved against backward, sexist Islamists and fundamentalists. Egyptian president and military officer Gamal Abdel Nasser embodies this idea of saving Egyptian women from fundamentalist Islamists by quoting the representative of the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Houdabi: "a ruler is responsible for veiling women and women must not go to work" (Kandil, 2018, paragraph 10). Nasser disagrees that "I think that when a woman works, we are protecting her [this way]. Why do [some women] go astray? They do so because of the need and poverty" (Ibid.). Such "protection" can be forceful, violent and indiscriminatory like in the collective imprisonment and the torture of political male and female opponents whether Islamists, liberals or communists (Amar 2013; Zakarriya 2014). Women work but are not integrated into the decision-making processes. They have relative freedom restricted by oppressive personal status laws. For instance, during the Arab Spring protests, military/militarized regimes in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Syria and royal regimes in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia used different forms of moralistic approaches and propaganda against protesters, particularly female protesters, and the instability and chaos they were causing. Women's bodies in these countries have been used as tools of political, religious, and ethnic superiority and violence (Johansson-Nogués 2013; Khalil 2016; Gengler 2015). A dominant moralistic slogan in Egypt is protecting the national honor that entails disciplining women's bodies and enforcing different forms of sexualized and gendered sovereignty. In Egypt, the Security Council of Armed Forces (SCAF), detained female protesters and exposed them to "virginity texts, hymen inspections that are of course forms of molestation or rape as such, insisting that only pious single young women could speak as legitimate voices of the people, and that the army would exclude from politics the working-class 'whores' whose public presence was an attack on national honor" (Amar 2013, 3). The SCAF's violence against female protesters failed. Rather, Egyptian women broke sexual, social, and cultural taboos about their violations in public spaces and embarrassed the SCAF. Likewise, Libyan women's bodies were targeted by the regime's military forces during Arab Spring, yet, with a different moralistic rhetoric than the Egyptian one. The Libyan moralistic rhetoric aimed at evoking tribal honor that a

violated woman brings shame and revenge to the whole tribe. Raping women in Libya, unlike in Egypt, generates withdrawal and silence that "some female victims of rape have been ostracized, divorced, disowned, forced to flee the country, have committed suicide, and some have allegedly been killed by their relatives because of the shame and dishonour that rape brings to the family and even the tribe. The silence surrounding rape existed before the conflict as well" (Human Rights Report 2012, 139).

Power, religion, and gender shape the position of women's public and political roles in Gulf royal regimes that develop their distinct moralistic rhetoric. For instance, during the protests in 2011 in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, protesters were defamed as "Shia" who collaborate with Iran to disturb Sunna Arab communities, thus, female protesters were seen not only as immoral women who challenged values of seclusion and separation of sexes in Gulf cultures but also as the ones who betrayed their countries. Female protesters were tortured, imprisoned, sexually harassed and violated. Saudi Arabian feminist activists such as Noha al-Balawi, Aziza al-Yousef, and Loujain al-Hathloul, and Bahraini feminists such as Hajer Mansoor, Fadhila Al Mubarak, and Ghada Jamsheer were targeted by police mainly for challenging deep-seated religious and political patriarchies (Batrawy 2019; Dahan 2018; Diwan 2021). The unprecedented levels of public violence against feminists and female activists in many contemporary Arab countries can be seen as reflecting historic changes in Arab women's relationships with and understandings of patriarchal and fundamentalist-like religious, and political authorities in their countries. Although these religious and political authorities use violence and moral defamation to silence women, they also show fear of growing women's impact on politics of freedom and religious values. The final section of this paper traces three examples of ecofeminist theologians whose works and impact not merely show the validity of the diversity and multiplicity of the interpretations of the position of women in Islam but reflect how Arab women have been essential elements of defending Islam against the intersection of fundamentalist-like religious and political structures in Arab countries.

PART TWO: ECOFEMINIST THEOLOGIANS IN MODERN ARABIC CONTEXTS

Amid the above-described disturbing, and rapidly changing cultural, political, and religious polarities, deals and conflicts, Arab ecofeminist theologians such as Morocco Fatima Mernissi and Fatima al Kabbai, Egyptian Aisha Abdel Rahman, Nawal el Saadawi and Zainab al Ghazali, Iraqi Amina al Sadr, Syrian Munira al Qubysi and later Saudi Arabian Mai Yamani, among others, stand out as influential (eco)feminist theologians. They gain credibility because they studied Quran, Hadith and different Fiqh schools and they argue they represent Islam's viewpoints on women's roles in society. Although these feminist/female theologians offer different interpretations of the positions of women in Islam, their ideas not only have been shaping women's activism and rights in most Arab countries but help in deconstructing different forms of fundamentalist movements in the region as well. They all discuss women's agency within public and private spaces and their socioeconomic positions. One great achievement of modern (eco)feminist theologians is that they have revived the marginalized and ignored history of female Islamic scholars. Although Mernissi, el Saadawi and al Ghazali represent different visions of the position of women in Islam, they exemplify Ruether's description of feminist theology as "consciously pluralistic in critique of androcentrism and misogyny of patriarchal theology" (Ruether 1998, 703). Ruether continues:

> Any theology which can be defined without reference to feminism is a particular kind of theology, namely, patriarchal theology. Patriarchal theology is the kind of theology we have had in the past, a theology defined not only without the participation of women, but to exclude the participation of women. What is emerging today is a feminist critique of patriarchal theology, or feminist theology. (Ibid.)

This paper argues that Merissa's, el Saadawi's and al Ghazali's different interpretations of the positions of women in Islam not only have been shaping women's activism and rights in most modern Arab countries but help in exposing different forms of fundamentalist-like movements in the region as well. It argues further that Mernissi, el Saadawi and al Ghazali engage directly with politics of space and gender within Islamic teachings. Defining exactly what the position of women in Islam is seems an

https://doi.org/10.59893/jcs.16(45).004

impossible task. A simple question emerges: what kind of Islam, where, and when? Is it the Islam practised in Egypt, and Syria, for example, where women work, get education, and appear in public? Or is it the Islam in Afghanistan that deprives women of education and secludes them completely? Or the Islam in Saudi Arabia where women get an education and work but fight to guardianship system and cannot drive? Defining one Islam and hence one viewpoint of the position of women in Islam challenges the dynamic realities of the interpretations of the Quran and the Hadith throughout different historical epochs and within diverse, global, and local socio-economic, political, and ideological contexts and changes.

Likewise, classifying Arab feminist theologians is equally difficult. Mernissi, el Saadawi and al Ghazali reflect this state of the diversity and multiplicity of the interpretations of Islam or Sharia as embodied in the Quran and Hadith. Consequently, this paper does not categorize Mernissi, el Saadawi and al Ghazali but rather attempts to understand and describe the motivations behind their feminist activism and their readings of politics, religion, and gender in general. Al Ghazali can be seen as an Islamist feminist whose ideas and interpretations of Islam are part of the projects and agendas of political Islam movements. Al Ghazali adopts a very traditional viewpoint and indicates that women's "first, holy, and most important mission in life is to be a mother and a wife" (Al Ghazali 1989, 48). For al Ghazali, the woman seeking a divorce from her husband commits a huge offense for "there is not anything more repulsive than a woman destroying her marriage and her motherhood?" (Ibid.).

Al Ghazali was not the traditional housewife and mother she promoted. Rather, she was a vocal political activist and supported the establishment of a strong and extended Islamic state (Al Ghazali 2000). Al Ghazali uncritically embraced traditionalist Islamic thoughts by scholars such as Abu Hamid al Ghazali and Ibn Taymiyyah, and her understanding of the position of women in Islam can be seen as contradictory and superficial. For example, al Ghazali believed that God chose a specific elite minority, who are the Muslim Brotherhoods, to lead Arabs and Muslims to create a true Islamic society and to get rid of Western imperialism (Al Ghazali 2000). Al Ghazali limited women's public roles to the service of building the aspired Islamic state. She openly adopted the political and moral stances of the Muslim Brotherhoods in Egypt who accuse liberal and secular feminists of fighting Islamic values and civilization by imitating the colonial West:

> Yes, my lady, you are responsible for our subjection to non-Muslims who are instigators of unbelief, licentiousness, and savagery […] you have taken to showy adornment and rebellion against our religion and all of our inheritances. Yes, my lady, you are responsible for the decline of Islamic civilization, its supremacy and what it gives to life, the gift that Allah—praise Him—bestowed upon the Islamic community. (Al Ghazali 1990, 115)

As women actively participated in public affairs under the leadership of Prophet Mohamed, Mernissi, unlike al Ghazali, distinguishes between the different types of religious scholars who have attempted to interpret Hadith and Quran, confirming that they are not immune to criticism and the rethinking of their ideas: "the body of the *ulama* (scholars) was very heterogeneous, riddled with conflicting interests of all kinds, with ethnic conflict not being the least. There were not only experts of Arab origin" (Mernissi 1991, viii). One authentic but sexist Hadith states that "those who entrust their affairs to a woman will never know prosperity!" (Mernissi 1991, 58). Women can vote, and participate in elections, jihad, and protests but they are not entitled to rule or lead. While al Ghazali does not reject this Hadith that denies women any political or leadership role, Mernissi searches for the origin of this discriminating Hadith. Mernissi traces that this Hadith was specifically used after the Battle of the Camel to refer to A'isha, who was Prophet Mohamed's wife, and who after his death was in command of the Sunni side in the Battle of the Camel and who lost to Shi'ites led by Ali Ibn Abi Talib. It is an easy way to blame A'isha as a woman for the loss while the Prophet and many Muslim leaders had lost many battles as well. One of the essential characteristics of the narrators of Hadith is credibility and honesty. Applying such a rule to Abu Barka, Mernissi reveals that Abu Barka should be eliminated as a reliable narrator of Hadith since "one of the biographies of him tells us that he was convicted of and flogged for false testimony by the caliph Umar Ibn al-Khattab" (Ibid., 60).

Like Ibn Rushd, Mernissi discusses the essential role of the marriage between politicians and imams in controlling space and time to inhibit change through manipulating past Islamic heritage. Mernissi argues further that "Westerners consume the past as a hobby, as a pastime, as a rest from the stress of the present. We persist in making it a profession, a vocation, an outlook. By invoking our ancestors at every turn, we live the present as an

https://doi.org/10.59893/jcs.16(45).004

interlude in which we are little involved. At the extreme, the present is a distressing contretemps to us" (Ibid., 21). Mernissi relates women's public roles in relation to dominant patriarchal political structures in Muslim countries that sign the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and assert their respect for fundamental freedoms as the principle and spirit of their constitutions but, patriarchal regimes aim to stop and marginalize diverse ideas and free thinking. Mernissi examines the major veil or hijab verses differently arguing that the veil is more related to private spaces. For instance, she argues that Verse 53 of sura 33, regarded by the founders of religious knowledge as the basis of the institution of the *hijab*, is meant for the incident that took place during the night of the Prophet's wedding to Zaynab in the fifth year of the Islamic calendar where some men and women entered the prophet's house without permission. Mernissi explains further that "the Prophet was threatened by men who stated during his lifetime their desire to marry his wives after his death. […] The *hijab* was to be the solution to a whole web of conflicts and tensions" (Mernissi 1991, 92). Mernissi convincingly refutes dominant interpretations of other veil verses arguing that protecting women from change by veiling them and shutting them out of the world meant isolating the community to protect it from the West. Instigating and upholding fading masculinist traditions as a means of putting things back in a hierarchical order. Many Muslim countries issue sexist laws that assure hierarchy and respect for normative forms of authority inside the house and use security repression to ensure hierarchy outside the house. Mernissi regards the strong return of traditional ideas of veiling and secluding Muslim women as planned tools of political-religious autocracy:

> The metamorphosis of the Muslim woman from a veiled, secluded, marginalized object, reduced to inertia, into a subject with constitutional rights, erased the lines that defined the identity hierarchy which organized politics and relations between the sexes. […]. Traditional society produced Muslims who were literally "submissive" to the will of the group. Individuality in such a system is discouraged; any private initiative is *bid'a* (innovation), which necessarily constitutes errant behavior (Identified with rebellion). (Mernissi 1991, 22–23)

For Mernissi, postcolonial Muslim Arab societies have problematic relationships with the concepts of time, development, and identity. While modern societies advance individuality and freedom of expression, Muslim countries suffer despotic regimes supported by corrupt religious structures, both resurrect and project the past on the present to inhibit real development. Mernissi is not the only Arab female intellectual and feminist to refute Islamic heritage. In 1972, Egyptian physician, liberal-postcolonial feminist, writer, and political activist el Saadawi published her famous book "Women and Sex" which explores and relates different forms of private and public violence in Egypt and many Arab contexts including virginity, marital rape, wife, or daughter beating, sexual harassment, honor crimes and psychological pressure and depression (El Saadawi 1972). Like Mernissi, Saadawi argues that many of the interpretations of the Quran and Hadith are prejudiced against women. She mentions examples of early Muslim women who actively participated in public affairs and in wars such as A'isha who fought in several wars and battles and was actively involved in politics and cultural and literary activities to the degree that led the theologian of the Muslims. Many examples of Hadith were memorized and corrected by women who accompanied Prophet Mohamed. Other examples of women fighters are Nessiba Bint Ka'ab who fought with her sword by the side of Muhammad in the battle of Uhud, and had been wounded 13 times, and Urn Sulaym Bint Malhan who tied a dagger around her waist above her pregnant belly and fought in the ranks of Muhammad and his followers (El Saadawi 1982, 197–198). Yet, el Saadawi has a global approach to women's seclusion and the veil arguing that "the oppression of women is not essentially due to specific religious ideologies. The great religions of the world (of both East and West) uphold similar principles as far as the submission of women to men is concerned. They also agree in the attribution of masculine characteristics to God" (El Saadawi 1982, 192). For Saadawi, the veil "is a political symbol and has nothing to do with Islam. There is not a single verse in the Qur'an explicitly mandating it. This is a political movement using the head of women for political reasons" (Nassef 1993, 5). El Saadawi continues that "women are pushed to be just bodies – either to be veiled under religion, or to be veiled by makeup. Both are very significant of the oppression of women by religious fundamentalism and US consumerism" (Raphael 2018, 7). El Saadawi dates the problem of Arab and Muslim women to the

JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE STUDIES NO 16 (45)
https://doi.org/10.59893/jcs.16(45).004

politicization of Islam as a power ideology and the dominance of global hierarchical economic and neoimperial structures:

> Arab women are still exposed to different forms of oppression (national, class and sexual). The original cause of their triple oppression is not Islam but the patriarchal class system which manifests itself internationally as world capitalism and imperialism, and nationally in the feudal and capitalist classes of the Third World countries. […]. Women's only hope lies in political organization and a patient long-enduring struggle to become an effective political power which will force society to change and abolish the structures which maintain women victims of the crudest, most cruel, and sometimes most sophisticated forms of oppression and exploitation. (El Saadawi 1982, 206)

El Saadawi argues further that the banners of religion have been utilized by military regimes in the Arab world and beyond such as "to overthrow Mossadeq and restore the rule of the oil monopolies in Iran, to close down on Sukarno and perpetrate mass murder on an unprecedented scale in Indonesia, to crush Salvador Allende and establish a military dictatorship in Chile and to ignite the fratricidal war being waged for long months in Lebanon" (El Saadawi 1980, 11). Women's oppression and seclusion are the product of hierarchical power structures, whether religious, military, or modern, that make one class rule over another and hence men dominate over women to sustain and constitute the core of patriarchal class, sexual and ethnic relations. Like al Ghazali, el Saadawi seeks political revolution against sociopolitical and economic patriarchal structures. In 1981, el Saadawi was imprisoned because she attacked President Anwar Sadat for his unilateral peace treaty with Israel and his open-door economic policies. In 1982, el Saadawi was released from prison after the assassination of Sadat and founded the Arab Women's Solidarity Association, an independent feminist organization, that was banned later by President Mubarak in 1992. El Saadawi was also oppressed by Islamists who accused her of fighting Islam and was taken to court by Hisba law twice. While al Ghazali aspires to build an Islamic State, el Saadawi calls for global and local fights of "the veil of the mind, by education, by religion, by patriarchy, by fear, by marriage, by the moral code. As women, we are always pushed to be hidden, to be veiled, even if we are not aware of that":

> Progressive groups should unite. We are divided and scattered. There must be efforts for unity. Women and men fighting against the IMF [International Monetary Fund] and the World Bank should fight together. Local and global resistance should not be separated. We must give a lot of attention to organisation and unveiling of the mind. The new superpower of the people should be organized. (Nassef 1993, 9)

Since 2011, women in many Arab countries such as Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon have been demonstrating for political and social change and justice. Arab women have experienced all forms of violence including sexual harassment, rape, torture, and imprisonment (Boger 2019; Johansson-Nogués 2013). Islamist feminists and female followers of the Muslim Brotherhoods in Egypt, for example, actively participated in protests and camped in public spaces. Women's votes helped Muslim Brotherhoods in Egypt and Tunisia to gain parliamentary elections and the presidency. Compared to their counterparts in the early twentieth century and despite widespread despotism and repression, the majority of Arab women, whether politically-affiliated, such as Islamist feminists and female followers of the Muslim Brotherhoods, or liberal feminists, or Islamic feminists, or apolitical common women, express remarkable political awareness. However, the post-2011 eras clearly show and reintroduce the deep-seated binary between fundamenttalist-like structures of political Islam and military/militarized regimes in different Arab contexts.

CONCLUSION

This paper attempts to examine the concepts of fundamentalism and essentialism as political constructs, meant to subjugate and insecuritize both men and women as dependents of hierarchical and exclusive authorities. It traces how within different Arab countries, Islamist movements and militarized/military or royal regimes, though competing over power, share and develop fundamentalist-like practices, and ideas to serve their political ambitions, and to marginalize their opponents. Arab ecofeminist theologians have played an important role in deconstructing religious and nonreligious fundamentalist orders by approaching Islamic heritage from different perspectives. For instance, Fatima Mernissi discusses Islam and women from a historical perspective, Nawal el Saadawi

https://doi.org/10.59893/jcs.16(45).004

uses a postcolonial, political approach. Zainab al Ghazali studies Islam and women within the Muslim Brotherhood's political project of establishing the Islamic State. The writings of these ecofeminist theologians are very relevant to understanding the nature and politics of domineering fundamentalisms and essentiallisms in Arab countries, and how women's public roles and agencies develop and change as they fight, refute or compromise with varied fundamentalist authorities in Arab countries.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The research has been funded by the European Union (ERC, GulfFeminisms, 101078083). Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the European Research Council Executive Agency. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.

REFERENCES

1. AbuKhalil, A. (1994). "The Incoherence of Islamic Fundamentalism: Arab Islamic Thought at the End of the 20th Century." *Middle East Journal* 48 (4), 677–694.

2. Adams, C. (1993). *Ecofeminism and the Sacred.* New York: Continuum Intl Pub Group.

3. Adamson, P. and Taylor, R. C. (2004). *The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy*. Cambridge University Press.

4. Ahmed, B. (2011). "Mali: Voyage au coeur du Bamako wahhabite." *Jeune Afrique*, October 11. Available at: <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/179054/societe/mali-voyage-aucoeur-du-bamako-wahhabite/> (accessed September 2023).

5. Al Banna, H. (1944). "Min ahdaf Al Da'wa." *Muslim Brotherhood Magazine* 11, May 20, 3–4.

6. Al Ghazali, H. (2009). *The Etiquette of Marriage*. Cairo: Dar al Fajr li-turath.

7. Al Ghazali, H. (2010). *Ihya' Ulum al-din*. Cairo: Dar al Fajr li-turath.

8. Al Ghazali, Z. (1989). *Days from My Life*. India: Hindustan Publications.

9. Al Ghazali, Z. (1990). *Humūm al-mar'ah al-Muslimah wa-al-dāʻiyah Zaynab al-Ghazālī*. Cairo: Dār al-Iʻtisām.

10. Al Ghazali, Z. (2000). *Towards a New Resurrection*. Cairo: Amal for Islamic Publication.

11. Al-Najjar, S. M. (2003). "The Feminist Movement in the Gulf." *Al-Raida* XX (100), 29–37.

12. Amar, P. (2013). *The Security Archipelago: Human-security States, Sexual Politics, and the End of Neoliberalism*. Durham: Duke University Press.

13. Amin, Q. (1922). 1899. *The Liberation of Women*. Trans. S. Peterson. Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press.

14. Aquinas, T. (2007). *Commentary of Aristotle's Politics*. Trans. R. J. Reagan. London: Hacket Publishing Company, Inc.

15. Baer, M. D. (2021). *The Ottomans: Khans, Caesars, and Caliphs*. New York: Basic Books.

16. Batrawy, A. (2019). "Saudi Arabia Arrests Eight Supporters of Women's-"rights Activists." *The Globe and Mail*, April 5. Available at: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-saudi-arabia-arrests-eight-supporters-of-womens-rights-activists/> (accessed September 2023).

17. Bazzano, E. (2015). "Ibn Taymiyya, Radical Polymath: Intellectual Contributions." *Religion Compass* 9 (4), 117–139.

18. Boger, K. van den (2019). "Blood, Bodies, and Violence: Gender and Women's Embodied Agency in the Egyptian Uprisings Frontiers." *Journal of Women Studies* 40 (2), 62–92.

19. Chatty, D. (1996). *Mobile Pastoralists: Development Planning and Social Change in Oman*. New York: Columbia University Press.

20. Chomsky, N. (2006). "A Cacophony of Fundamentalism. Noam Chomsky & Gilbert Achcar interviewed by Stephen Shalom." *Mall and Guardian Online*, November 3.

https://doi.org/10.59893/jcs.16(45).004

21. Craig, E (ed.). (1998). *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. London: Routledge.

22. Dahan, N. (2018). “Saudi Women’s Rights Activist Arrested as Long-time Driving Ban Lifted.” *Middle East Eye*, June 29. Available at: <https://www.middleeasteye.net> (accessed September 2023).

23. Daoudi, A. (2018). “Introduction: Narrating and Translating Sexual Violence at Wartime in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA region).” *Boundary* 2, July 13. Available at: <https://www.boundary2.org/2018/07/> (accessed September 2023).

24. Dawisha, A. (2016). *Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair*. Princeton University Press.

25. El Saadawi, N. (1972). *Women and Sex*. Cairo: Future Publishing House.

26. El Saadawi, N. (1980). *The Hidden Face of Eve*. London: Zed Books.

27. El Saadawi, N. (1982). “Women and Islam.” *Women’s Studies International Forum* 5 (2), 193–206.

28. Fierro, M. (2021). *Abd Al-Mu’min: Mahdism and Caliphate in the Islamic West*. London: One World Publications.

29. Galal, E. (2014). *Arab TV-audiences: Negotiating Religion and Identity*. Bristol: Peter LANG international Academic Publishers.

30. Human Rights Report. (2012). *LIBYA 2012 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT*. Available at: <https://acjr.org.za/resource-centre/us-department-of-state-human-rights-report-libya-2012> (accessed August 2023).

31. Ibn Taymiyyah. (2011). *Majmou’ al-fatawa*. Cairo: Dar al Wafa. Available at: <https://www.archive.org/> (accessed September 2023).

32. Ibn Rushd. (1974). *Averroes on Plato’s Republic*. Trans. with an introduction and notes by R. Lerner. London: Cornell University Press.

33. Ibn Rushd. (2008). *Averroes: Tahafut al Tahafut*. Trans. with an introduction and notes by S. van den Bergh. Middlesex: Gibb Memorial Trust.

34. Johansson-Nogus, E. (2013). “Gendering the Arab Spring? Rights and (In)security of Tunisian, Egyptian and Libyan Women.” *Security Dialogue* 44 (5), 393–409.

35. Kandil, A. M. (2018). "How Abdel Nasser Described Muslim Brotherhood." *Egypt Today*, July 23. Available at: <https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/1/54557/> (accessed October 2023).

36. Macmaster, N. (2020). *Burning the Veil*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

37. Marty, M. and Appleby, R. S. (1991). "Introduction." In: *Fundamentalisms Observed*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

38. Matesan, I. E. (2020). "The Rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Potential for Violent Escalation." In: *The Violence Pendulum: Tactical Change in Islamist Groups in Egypt and Indonesia*. London: Oxford Academic.

39. Mernissi, M. (1991). *The Veil and the Male Elite: A Feminist Interpretation of Women's Rights in Islam*. Trans. M. Lakeland. New York: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc.

40. Mortimer, R. (1996). "Islamists, Soldiers, and Democrats: The Second Algerian War." *Middle East Journal* 50 (1), 18–39. Available at: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4328894> (accessed September 2023).

41. Nafi, B. M. (2017). *The Islamists: A Contextual History of Political Islam*. Trans. A. Farouk. London: Afro-Middle East Centre.

42. Nassef, A. (1993). "EGYPT: El Saadawi 'The Veil is a Political Symbol'." *Green Left* 574, November 17. Available at: <https://www. greenleft.org.au/> (accessed September 2023).

43. Palmer, M. (2007). *At the Heart of Terror: Islam, Jihadists and America's War on Terrorism*. New York: Rowman and Littlefield.

44. Peters, R., ed. (2005). *Jihad: A History in Documents*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP.

45. Ramdani, N. (2013). "Women in the 1919 Egyptian revolution." *Journal of International Women's Studies* 14 (2), 39–52.

46. Raphael, S. (2018). "Women Are Pushed to Be Just Bodies – Veiled Under Religion or Veiled by Makeup: Nawal El Saadawi On Feminism Today." *Refinery* 29, June 7. Available at: <http://www.refinery29.com/en-gb/2018/06/200895> (accessed September 2023).

47. Ruether, R. (1998). *Women and Redemption: A Theological History*. Minneapolis: Fortress Press.

48. Ruether, R. (2012). "Ecofeminism: The Challenge to Theology." *DEP* 20, 22–33.

49. Sahri, S. (2021). "Political Thought of Al Ghazali on Imamah: Debate between Theocracy and Democracy." *Theological Studies* 77 (3), 1–8.

50. Said, E. (1979). *Orientalism*. London: Vintage Books.

51. Said, E. (1997). *Covering Islam*. New York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group.

52. Sharif, M. M. (1963). *A History of Muslim Philosophy*. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz.

53. Solomon, H. and Tausch, A. (2020). "The Demise of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab World?" *Jewish Political Studies Review* 31 (1/2), 171–209.

54. Tanner, V. (2020). "Strengthening Women's Control over Land: Inheritance Reform in Tunisia." *DAI,* February 20. Available at: <dai-global-developments.com> (accessed October 2023).

55. Tchaicha, J. and Arfaoui, K. (2017). *The Tunisian Women's Rights Movement*. London: Routledge.

56. Voll, J. (1994). "Fundamentalism in the Sunni Arab World: Egypt and the Sudan." In: Martin, M. and Scott, R. (eds.) *Appleby Fundamentalisms Observed*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

57. Yavari, N. (2004). "Polysemous Texts and Reductionist Readings: Women and Heresy in the Siyar al-Muluk." In: *Views from the Edge: Essays in Honor of Richard W. Bulliet*. New York: Columbia University Press, 47–70.

58. Zakarriya, J. (2014). "Sexuality, Religion and Nationalism: A Contrapuntal Reading of the History of Female Activism andPolitical Change in Egypt." *FWSA: Journal of International Women's Studies* 16 (1), 47–61.

59. Zdanowski, J. (1994). "Military Organization of the Wahhabi Amirates (1750–1932)." *New Arabian Studies* 2, 130–139.